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ABSTRACT 
 
Financial Student Aid and Enrollment into Higher Education: 
New Evidence from Germany
*
 
We estimate the elasticity of enrollment into higher education with respect to the amount of 
means tested student aid (BAfoeG) provided by the federal government using the German 
Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP). Potential student aid is derived on the basis of a detailed tax-
benefit microsimulation model. Since potential student aid is a highly non-linear and 
discontinuous function of parental income, the effect of BAfoeG on students’ enrollment 
decisions can be identified separately from parental income and other family background 
variables. We find a small but significant positive elasticity similar in size to those reported in 
previous studies for the United States and other countries. 
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1  Introduction 
Public financial aid for students is provided in most OECD countries with the aim of 
increasing equity in access to as well as the overall enrollment into tertiary education (for an 
overview see OECD, 2007). Whether financial student aid achieves this aim is an important 
question both in public economics and in the public policy debate. Identification of the causal 
effect of financial student aid is difficult because potential endogeneity and selectivity of 
enrollment decisions regarding observed and unobserved individual characteristics also 
affecting the availability of financial student aid. Whilst there are numerous empirical studies 
on this question for the US, there is only scant empirical evidence for other OECD countries, 
and for European countries in particular. This study contributes to the growing literature on 
the causal effects of financial student aid on enrollment rates into tertiary education and 
provides empirical evidence on this topic for Germany.  
Several recent studies for the US have attempted to estimate the effects of financial 
student aid on enrollment into higher education by making use of exogenous changes in the 
price of college faced by specific groups of students. These studies show that financial 
incentives such as tuition, grants and loans affect educational choices of high-school alumni. 
For the US, it was estimated that a 1,000$ change in direct cost of college changes the college 
entry rates by 3 to 4 percentage points (see Dynarski 2003 or Kane 2003 for an overview of 
this literature). This effect has been found in studies that analyzed an increase in the costs of 
college (e.g. Kane 1994) as well as a decrease of the costs by an extension of financial aid for 
students (e.g. Dynarski 2000 or Abraham and Clark 2006). For a selective sample of high-
school alumni who applied for a specific grant program, a more recent study (Kane 2003) 
reports lower elasticities. Seftor and Turner (2002) have found sizeable effects of the 
introduction of a means tested federal grant program on the enrollment rates of already 
somewhat older alumni. Finally, a recent case study by Linsenmeier et al. (2006) found that 
changes in the financial aid package introduced by a single college increased enrollment rates 
of low-income minority students significantly but had no significant overall effect. 
For European countries, we are aware of only a few empirical studies analyzing the 
impact of student aid on enrollment into tertiary education. In a comparative study for several 
European countries, Winter-Ebmer and Wirz (2002) analyze the overall effect of public 
funding on enrollment into higher education. They find that public expenditures for the 
education system as a whole affect enrollment into university by an elasticity of 1, although 
no significant effect of an additional increase of expenditures for higher education alone was 
found. Exploiting variations in the generosity of the Swedish financial aid for student system   2
over time, Frederiksson (1997) finds a positive effect of the amount of monthly student aid on 
the enrollment rate to university in Sweden on the basis of a time-series analysis. Nielsen et 
al. (2008) analyze the effects of a Danish student aid reform on enrollment rates into tertiary 
education and find weaker effects than those obtained in some of the mentioned studies for 
the US.  
For Germany, Lauer (2002) finds on the basis of a microeconometric choice model 
estimated on data from the German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP) that extending the 
entitlement to BAfoeG seems to be more effective in raising enrollment rates into higher 
education than increasing the BAfoeG amount received by the individual student entitled to 
this subsidy. Treating the BAfoeG reform of 1990 as a “natural experiment”, by which 
student aid was changed from a full loan system to a partial loan-grant system, Baumgartner 
and Steiner (2005) find on the basis of a simple “differenence-in-difference” approach using 
SOEP data that this change had no significant influence on enrollment rates into higher 
education. Applying the same empirical methododogy, Baumgartner and Steiner (2006) also 
could not find a significant effect on enrollment rates of the 2001 BAfoeG reform, which 
increased the amount received by eligible students by an average of 10%. One reason for the 
insignificance of the BAfoeG effects in these latter studies might be that the “difference-in-
difference” estimator only uses eligibility status for the identification of the BAfoeG effect 
and may therefore be rather inefficient, especially in relatively small samples.  
In our study, we follow a different identification strategy that uses BAfoeG information 
more efficiently and, at the same time, also takes into account the endogeneity of students’ 
enrollment decisions into higher education and the amount of financial aid. The observed 
amount of student aid is obviously highly endogeneous because it is zero for those potential 
students not enrolling into higher education. Furthermore, there might be other unobserved 
factors affecting both an individual’s enrollment decision and the amount of BAfoeG 
received. We circumvent these endogeneity problems by simulating for each alumni the 
potential (counterfactual) BAfoeG amount he or she could receive in case she enrolled in 
tertiary education using a detailed tax-benefit microsimulation model. As described in the 
next section, the potential individual BAfoeG amount is a highly nonlinear function of 
parental income due to the means test, important differences in the definition of income 
relevant for the calculation of BAfoeG, the non-indexation of the BAfoeG amounts to 
inflation, and the dependence of BAfoeG on family background variables other than income. 
We can thus identify the effect of BAfoeG on enrollment decisions separately from the effect 
of parents’ income without relying on specific functional form assumptions. To estimate these   3
effects we specify a simple model of educational choice with a student’s potential BAfoeG 
amount and parental income as explanatory variables (Section 3). To account for both the 
timing of transitions into higher education and right-censored observations, we estimate a 
discrete-time hazard rate model with the two competing risks „vocational training“ and 
„enrollment into university“ using an unbalanced panel of alumni observed in the period 
1999-2005.  
Our estimation results summarized in Section 4 show that the BAfoeG amount has a 
positive significant effect on enrollment rates into higher education, which is comparable to 
those found in previous studies for the U.S.: An increase of BAfoeG by 1,000 Euro per year 
would increase the enrollment rate of high-school alumni by 2 percentage points, from 
currently 76 % to 78 %. This estimate is of similar size as those obtained for other countries 
in the studies mentioned above. We also find that the estimated enrollment effect with respect 
to the BAfoeG amount is substantially larger than the one regarding parental income. These 
results seem robust to a number of sensitivity checks. We conclude that marginal increases in 
financial student aid, as introduced by two recent reforms, have only small effects on average 
enrollment rates into higher education in Germany. 
2  Institutional Background 
Financial aid for students in Germany in its current form was introduced by the Federal 
students’ financial assistance scheme (Berufsausbildungsfoerderungsgesetz, BAfoeG) in 
1971. In 2005, about 1.5 billion Euro were spent on BAfoeG for students. The general 
purpose of the introduction of this scheme was to enhance equal opportunities in education. 
Thus, the transfer scheme is means-tested and depends on parental income, income of an 
eventual married spouse, as well as income and asset of the applicant. Moreover, it depends 
on the presence, age and income of siblings and other household members. When it was 
introduced in 1971, BAfoeG was granted as a non-refundable subsidy. In the first year after 
its introduction, almost 45% of all students were granted the transfer. At the beginning of the 
1980s, BAfoeG was changed into an interest-free loan that had to be repaid after completion 
of university education. Since 1991, 50% of “BAfoeG” is paid as a grant and 50% as a loan 
that has to be repaid after completion of tertiary education The loan part of BAfoeG has to be 
repaid beginning 5 years after the last BAfoeG amount has been received. Individuals with a 
monthly net income below 960 Euro (this threshold is increased if children are present in the 
household) are exempt from repayment obligations. For alumni with outstanding grades, there 
are reductions of repayment obligations.   4
As an approximation, the aid scheme can be described as follows. The monthly BAfoeG 
amount B is granted in full amount to students whose parents’ income Y does not exceed a 
certain threshold C. The part of parents’ income exceeding C is withdrawn at a rate of 50%. 
Formally, the scheme can thus be described as: 
(1)  () max 0,
2
YC
BB
−
=−  
The components of parents’ income Y includes gross income from all sources less taxes and 
social security contributions. Old age pensions and unemployment benefits, that are not fully 
part of taxable income in Germany, are also part of Y. Other social transfers such as social 
assistance, however, are not counted as parental income in this definition. In the case of a 
married student, Y also includes income of the married spouse. The threshold C depends on 
the number of household members. If a student has siblings who are also receiving BAfoeG, 
the total expression of the fraction is equally divided among all siblings eligible for BAfoeG. 
The parameters of this function are changed every few years. Before 2001, the monthly 
maximum BAfoeG claim B amounted to 550 Euro. After 2001, this was increased to 585. The 
income threshold C for parents living in the same household without other children amounted 
to 1,161 Euro before 2001 and was then increased to 1,440 Euro per  month.  
Figure 1:   Development of monthly BAfoeG amount, income thresholds 
(left scale) and share of recipients (in %, right scale) 
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Note: Share of students receiving BAfoeG is only available up to the year 2005.  
Source: Deutscher Bundestag (2007).  
 
Figure 1 shows the development of the maximum monthly BAfoeG amount as well as the 
thresholds for parental income. Moreover, the graph shows the share of students actually   5
taking-up BAfoeG. Obviously, the share of about 45 % recipients among all students right 
after introduction of the scheme in the early 1970s has dramatically declined and remains 
between 20 and 25 percent. After the share declined in the late 1990s to almost 20 percent, the 
BAfoeG reform of 2001 increased the share up to 25% again. Very recently, a new „BAfoeG 
reform“ has been decided by German parliament. Under this reform, both the income 
thresholds as well as the amount of BAfoeG claims is increased by 10 percent. As can be seen 
from Figure 1, this is the first reform since the last increase in these parameters in the year 
2001.  
3  Empirical Methodology  
3.1  Data and Identification Strategy  
Most previous studies on the effect of financial aid for students on the enrollment decision 
rely on data that only include information on financial student aid for those high school 
alumni who actually enrolled into tertiary education. Thus, the observed amount of student 
aid is a highly endogenous variable, for various reasons. The most obvious reason is that the 
observed amount of student aid for those not enrolling into higher education is zero, of 
course. Furthermore, there is the usual suspicion of unobserved factors affecting both an 
individual’s enrollment decision and the amount of BAfoeG received (see, among others, 
Dynarski 2003 or Van der Klaauw 2002). In the present context, this may be related to a 
potential students (unobserved) employment behavior in case student aid is means tested 
regarding student’s own income. The usual approach is to circumvent these endogeneity 
problems is to make use of some sort of exogenous variation in the financial aid amount 
introduced by a reform (see, e.g., Dynarski, 2003, Baumgartner and Steiner, 2005, 2006). 
Since this identification strategy relies on the information whether or not someone was 
affected by the reform treatment effects can usually not be estimated very precisely in small 
or medium-sized samples. Furthermore, estimated treatment effects are only interpretable 
relative to the specific policy change used for the identification and cannot be used to 
calculate the marginal effects of changing financial student aid or to predict the likely effects 
of different student aid reforms. 
Since we have to rely on a relatively small sample size and want to estimate the effect 
of enrollment into tertiary education with respect to changes in the amount of BAfoeG, we 
circumvent the problem of endogeneity of the observed BAfoeG amount, by calculating for 
each individual the potential BAfoeG amount using a tax-benefit microsimulation model   6
based on the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP).
1 For this analysis, we have 
integrated the simulation of the detailed BAfoeG regulations into this tax-benefit model. As 
has been explained in the previous section, BAfoeG is a highly non-linear function of parent’s 
income (or perhaps the income of the student’s married spouse), age, number and income of 
siblings or other household members. Moreover, the amount of BAfoeG depends on the 
student’s income. However, since this is endogenous, we calculate for each observation the 
potential amount of BAfoeG on the case that the individual does not have own earnings. Still, 
we have to assume that the potential BAfoeG amount is not correlated with unobserved 
factors affecting their childrens’ enrollment decision.  
Following this argument, we have to include all other factors that might influence the 
educational decision of high-school alumni and are correlated with the potential BAfoeG 
amount, in particular parental background variables such as the parents’ education and their 
income. As has been explained above, financial aid and parents’ income are correlated, since 
BAfoeG is mainly a function of parents’ income and household size. The question then 
remains, how the effects of these two variables, BAfoeG and net parents’ income can be 
identified. We argue that identification of the two effects comes from several sources. First of 
all, BAfoeG is a non-linear function of a gross measure of the parents’ income with an 
important discontinuity induced by the means tests. Furthermore, parents’ net income is also a 
highly non-linear function of gross income, due to the progressivity of the German personal 
income tax and various means tested income transfers. Figure A1 in the Appendix illustrates 
this variation. Second, there was a reform of the BAfoeG scheme in 2001 (which lies in our 
observation period 1999-2005), when all parameters of the BAfoeG function explained in 
section 2 above where increased. This reform induced an exogenous increase in the potential 
BAfoeG amount for the years after 2001. Finally, we deflate both income and the BAfoeG 
amount to prices of 2000. Since the BAfoeG amounts and the basic allowances are not 
indexed to inflation and their nominal amounts where changed only once (under the 2001 
reform) in the observation period, there is additional variation in the amount of BAfoeG and 
parents’ net income induced by bracket creeping, as shown by Figure A2 in the Appendix. 
As already mentioned above, we use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
Study (SOEP). Our sample consists of all persons that state to have a completed the entrance-
level degree for university education (i.e, Abitur) in the years 1999 to 2005. This gives us a 
                                                 
1 The microsimulation model STSM we us is described in Steiner et al. (2008). The SOEP is a very rich 
longitudinal data set that contains information on all sorts of income, activities and many other socio-economic 
variables for about 20,000 individuals living in roughly 12,000 households each year; see Wagner et al. (2007) 
for more information on the SOEP.    7
total number of 634 individuals. We drop all observations for whom we cannot track the 
parents and thus lack the information of parental income and other background variables, and 
cannot calculate the potential claim for student’s aid. This leaves us a sample of 599 
individuals.  
The panel structure of the SOEP allows us to track parental income of all high-school 
alumni, even if they do not live in the same household as their parents, which is required to 
simulate the exact amount of potential BAfoeG claim for all high-school alumni. Panel 
information is also needed to identify transitions into higher education. In the SOEP, each 
individual is asked whether he or she has passed an educational degree since the previous 
interview. The academic year in Germany usually starts in September (for schools) or October 
(for universities) and ends by June/July (differs by federal state). Thus, educational degrees 
such as high-school degree („Abitur“) or other university admission degrees are usually 
obtained in May or June. Enrollment into university can only start at the beginning of each 
term, i.e. usually in October (sometimes also for the spring term, which begins in April or 
March). In the SOEP, more than 75 percent of all individuals are interviewed within the first 
quarter of each year. At the time of their interview, all persons are asked whether they have 
gained an educational degree (i.e. „Abitur“) since the past interview. This timing implies that 
at time period t, when we learn about a university admission degree (in time period t-1), we 
might already observe a transition to university or a vocational training. On the other hand, 
many students do not enroll to university in the first year after high-school but several years 
after. Thus, we track observations for a maximum of 5 years after completion of their high-
school degree. Observations for individuals who obtained their entrance level (high-school 
degree) later than in 2000 and have not enrolled into higher education before the observation 
period ends are treated as right-censored in the estimation. 
Table 1:   Sample size and observed transitions 
Transition observed 
after period ... 
Vocational training  University  Right censored 
cases 
Total 
1 77  163  73  313 
2 51  146  23  220 
3 5  28  6  39 
4 0  19  2  21 
5 1  5  0  6 
Total   134  361  104  599 
Source: SOEP, waves 2000-2006. 
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Of all 599 high-school alumni in our sample, 361 (60%) choose to enroll in university in the 
maximum of 5 years after they have completed high-school and 134 (22%) choose vocational 
training. The remaining 104 observations (17%) are right-censored, i.e. we do not observe a 
transition into vocational training or university education during the observation period. In 
total, we observe 929 spells. 
Table 2 lists descriptive statistics of the main explanatory variables. As already 
explained above, one main advantage of the SOEP data is that we can track the parents of 
most of the high-school alumni even if they do not live in the same household as their parents 
any more due to the panel structure of the data. Thus, we have information on the parents’ 
income as well as educational background. The panel structure of the data also allows us to 
track all siblings of the high-school alumni in our sample. We include the number of siblings 
in the form of two dummy variables, one indicating that a person has one sibling and one 
dummy indicating that a person has two ore more siblings. 
Table 2:  Descriptive statistics  
 Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Family background variables    
Father holds university degree  0.28  − 
Mother holds university degree  0.20  − 
Dummy indicating 1 sibling  0.49  − 
Dummy indicating more than 1 sibling  0.11  − 
Dummy indicating sex = male  0.53  − 
    
BAfoeG related Variables     
Share of observations eligible for BAfoeG  0.56  − 
BAfoeG amount per month among those eligible (in €)*  286  131 
Monthly BAfoeG amount (in €)*  149  165 
    
Income related Variables     
Parents’ equivalence income: net monthly income of parents’ 
household, divided by square root of household members (in €)* 
1,887 1,038 
Number of observations  929 
* Parents’ income and amount of BAfoeG is measured in real values (prices of 2000). 
Source: SOEP, waves 2000-2006. 
 
Obviously, the most important variable in our estimation is the potential amount of BAfoeG 
claim. This is simulated for all high-school alumni using the  tax-benefit simulation model   9
STSM.
2 The STSM has been augmented by a modul that simulates BAfoeG  claims for this 
purpose. 56% of all high-school alumni in our sample were eligible to BAfoeG if they would 
decide to enroll into university. The average positive claim amounts to 286 Euro per month, 
the unconditional mean amounts to 149 Euro per month. As a measure of parental income we 
include the net monthly income of the household of the parents, which we divide by the 
square root of household members in order to account for economies of scale through sharing 
the household. We argue that this reflects the resources of the family better than net 
household income. If parents are not living together, we add the sum of the equivalence 
incomes of the household in which the mother lives and the household of the father. 
3.2  Model Specification 
To estimate the elasticity of the enrollment rate into higher education to the amount of 
BAfoeG we specify a simple model of educational choice with the potential BAfoeG amount 
a student expects to receive if he or she were to enroll into higher education as an explanatory 
variable. To account for both the timing of transitions into higher education and right-
censored observations, we specify a discrete-time hazard rate model. Since a considerable 
share of all high-school alumni opts for a vocational training after high-school, we allow for 
two competing risks, namely „vocational training“ (A) and „enrollment into university“ (B). 
We assume that enrollment into university or vocational training are independent absorbing 
states and can occur only once a year. The destination specific hazard rate, | () ij i it x ht , i.e. a 
potential student’s conditional probability of making a transition into state j (j = A, B) in 
period t, given no transition has occurred until the beginning of that period, is specified by a 
multinomial logit: 
()
()
2
1
|
exp
(2)      ( )    
1e x p
ji t
ij i it
ji t
j
x
x
ht
x
=
′ β
=
′ +β ∑
 
The vector xit contains the potential BAfoeG amount and a number of other explanatory 
variables, such as parents’ net income, parents’ educational status and number of siblings 
which may vary over time. Moreover, we include time and state-specific dummy variables 
that control for differences in educational policies by time and states and other economic 
factors (business cycle etc.) that could affect the individual enrollment decision. 
                                                 
2 For more details on the tax-benefit model STSM, see  Steiner et al. (2008).   10
The “survivor rate”, S(t), which gives the (unconditional) probability of not having 
enrolled into higher education up to period t, can be written (ignoring person and time 
indices) as 
() ( ) ()
1 2
1 1
(3)      ( | ) 1 | ,  with   | ,
t
j
j k
St x ht x ht h t x
−
= =
=− =   ∑ ∏  
by virtue of the assumption that competing risks are independent. In terms of the hazard rate 
and the survivor function, the probability of a transition into state j in period t is given by 
() () ()
1
1
(4)      | | 1 |
t
jj Ptx htx h tx
τ
−
=
=−   ∏ . 
Assuming that, conditional on x, all observations are independent, the sample likelihood 
function is given by 
() ()
1
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  1,  if  individual   makes a transition into state   
with 
  0, otherwise.
ij
ij
δ

= 

 
Hence, for a person with an observed transition in the observation period the contribution to 
the likelihood function is given by the respective transition probability in equation (4), for a 
censored spell it is given by the survivor function in equation (3), both written in terms of the 
hazard rate. Note that the survivor function not only provides information on individuals 
right-censored at the end of the observation period, but also for those who left the panel due to 
sample attrition.  
4  Estimation Results 
The model described in the previous section is estimated on the basis of pooled SOEP data 
from waves 2000-2006.
3 We model the duration time in a flexible way with two baseline 
hazard rates, d2 and d3. d2 takes on the value 1 in time period 2 (and 0 else) and d3 takes on 
the value 1 in time period 3, 4 and 5. Time period 1 serves as reference category. These time 
dummies are interacted with the dummy indicating „male“, since men might make a transition 
to either vocational training or university later than women because many male youth undergo 
their civilian or military service immediately after school. In addition to the baseline hazards 
we also include year dummies in order to control for potential general trends. Table A1 in the 
                                                 
3 Unfortunately, we cannot use older waves since the microsimulation model STSM is not available for prior 
waves.    11
Appendix shows estimated coefficients. marginal effects and standard errors for both the 
transition rate into vocational training and into university education.  
Since we are primarily interested in this latter transition here, in Table 3 we focus on the 
marginal effects of the most important explanatory variables on the enrollment rate into 
university, where the marginal effects are evaluated at sample means. Since the mean elapsed 
spell duration is 1.6 years in the sample, the marginal effects can be interpreted as change in 
the transition rate into university between period 1 and 2. 
The time dummy indicating period 2 is strongly significant and positive, indicating that 
considerably more high-school alumni enroll in university one year after their high-school 
degree rather than right after school. This especially holds for men, although this interaction is 
only significant at the 10 percent level. The dummy for period 3 or more (d3) is not 
significant, neither is the interaction with the male dummy. Evaluated at the sample mean, 
men have a lower probability to enroll into university than women.  
Table 3:   Marginal effects on the transition rate to university 
  Marginal Effects  Std. Error 
d2 0.2784  0.0634 
d3 0.1045  0.0998 
d2×male  0.1503 0.0900 
d3×male  0.2201 0.1716 
male -0.2568  0.0475 
Monthly BAfoeG amount (in 100 Euro)
* 0.0327  0.0169 
Monthly net equivalence income of parents (in 100 Euro)
* 0.0060  0.0030 
Father holds university degree  -0.0143  0.0413 
Mother holds university degree  0.0938  0.0436 
One sibling  0.0315  0.0386 
More than one sibling  -0.0217  0.0616 
Year dummies and regional dummies skipped (see Table A1 in the Appendix) 
* The marginal effects for the monthly BAfoeG amount and parents’ income are the combined effects of the 
linear and the quadratic term of BAfoeG and parents’ income, respectively. 
Source: Estimation results in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
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The most important result in Table 3 is that the monthly BAfoeG amount has a positive and 
significant effect (at the 10 percent level) on the transition rate to university. Note that the 
marginal effect shown in Table 3 is the joint effect of the linear and quadratic term of the 
BAfoeG variable. This joint effect indicates that an increase of the monthly BAfoeG amount 
by 100 Euro increases the transition rate university by 3.3 percentage points. Another 
interesting result is that parental income has a positive and significant effect on the transition 
rate into university education, which is considerably smaller than the BAfoeG effect. Our 
results suggest that a 100 Euro increase of monthly net equivalence income of the parents’ 
household would increase the transition rate to university by 0.6 percentage points. This effect 
is significant at the 5 percent level. 
Interestingly, none of the other socio-economic background variables are statistically 
significant except for mother’s education: If the mother holds a university degree, the 
transition rate to university increases by 9 percentage points. All other family background 
variables (education of the father and number of siblings) do not have significant effects. This 
result, in particular the insignificance of the parental education variables, might seem 
surprising at first sight. However, we know from previous empirical studies that in Germany, 
also the choice of secondary education, and in particular upper secondary education is heavily 
influenced by the parents’ educational background (Lauer 2003). Thus, our interpretation of 
this result is that, once individuals have made it up to the high-school degree, parental 
education does not play a role for the choice of tertiary education any more, in particular since 
we also control for parental income. 
Our estimation predicts that after 5 periods, on average, 76 percent of all high-school 
alumni have chosen to start tertiary education. These results are in line with official statistics 
reporting that 75% of all high-school alumni enroll in university 5 periods after completion of 
the high-school degree (Statistisches Bundesamt 2007). Figure 2 shows the cumulated 
probability of transition to university separately for men and women.
4 
                                                 
4 The predictions are based on a model that has been estimated under the restriction that the BAfoeG claim does 
not have a significant effect on the transition to vocational training. This restriction does not change the 
marginal effects of the variables with respect to the transition into university. Estimation results of the full and 
the restricted model are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix.    13
Figure 2:   Cumulated probability of transition to university for men and women 
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Source: Estimation results in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
We use this cumulated probability in order to predict how an increase of monthly BAfoeG 
amount and parents’ income affects the cumulated probability of transition to university. In 
order to get comparable measures how BAfoeG or parental income affect the cumulated 
probability of transition to university to those that can be found in the literature, we increased 
both variables by 1,000 Euro per year and simulated the effect of this change on the 
cumulated probability of transition to university after 5 years. We find that an increase in 
BAfoeG for all high-school alumni by this amount increases the cumulated probability of 
transition to university, i.e. the enrollment rate after 5 years by 2 percentage points from 
76.2 % to 78.4 %. An increase of annual parental income by 1,000 Euro would increase the 
enrollment rate by about 0.5 percentage points (see Table 4).  
The effects we find for both the BAfoeG is somewhat smaller than estimates reported in 
the literature for the United States. Dynarski (2003) finds an increase in the enrollment rate of 
3.6 percentage points for every additional 1,000 US$ in her study on the effects of the 
Georgia HOPE scholarship program. Analyzing a grant program in the District of Columbia, 
Abraham and Clark (2006) find an increase in the enrollment rate of high-school graduation 
age residents of exactly the same amount, 3.6 percentage points, for every additional 1,000 
US $ of aid. Our results are, however, very much in line for those found for other European   14
countries. Nielsen et al. (2008), for example, find that a 1,000 US$ increase of financial aid 
for students in Denmark increases enrollment to university by 1-3 percentage points. 
Table 4:   Cumulated share (in%) of high-school alumni enrolling into university after an 
increase in BAfoeG or  parents’ income 
Time 
period 
Model prediction  BAfoeG is increased by 
1,000 Euro per year 
Parents’ income is increased 
by 1,000 Euro per year 
1 28.5  33.3  29.1 
2 64.2  68.8  64.9 
3 71.7  75.2  72.3 
4 74.8  77.5  75.4 
5 76.2  78.4  76.8 
Source: Estimation results in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
5  Sensitivity Analysis 
To check whether estimated BAfoeG effects on the transition rate to university are sensitive 
to model specification, we have performed several sensitivity checks. First, as an alternative 
to the flexible baseline hazard as specified in the model presented above, we have estimated a 
model with a linear specification of the baseline hazard. The estimation results of this model 
are reported in Table  A2 in the Appendix. The coefficients and marginal effects of the 
variables do not change much. In particular, the marginal effects of the BAfoeG and parents’ 
income variables are of similar magnitude as in the specification reported above. The only 
change concerns the pattern of the cumulated probabilities to transit to university. As can be 
seen from Figure A1 in the Appendix, the spike from period 1 to 2, in particular for males, 
disappears when the model is estimated with a linear specification of the baseline hazard. 
However, the cumulated probability of having enrolled into higher education after 5 years is 
very similar (0.77) to the one predicted based on the model with the flexible baseline hazard.  
Second, we have tested also a different functional form of the BAfoeG claim. Instead of 
the flexible specification as presented above, we estimated a model with a linear specification 
of the BAfoeG claim. The results of this estimation are presented in Table A3 in the 
Appendix. They show that in this model, the linear coefficient as well as the corresponding 
marginal effects of monthly BAfoeG and parental income are of very similar magnitude as in 
the model described in the previous section.  For this linear specification of the BAfoeG 
claim, we have also interacted this variable with the baseline hazard dummy variables in order   15
to check whether the influence of the potential BAfoeG claim varies for different periods. 
However, we found that these interaction terms are not significant.  
Another sensitivity test regards the problem of sample attrition. A relatively high share 
of high-school alumni are leaving the SOEP a few years after graduation.
5 If this happens 
before we observe the first transition to vocational training or university education, this 
attrition is relevant for our sample and may affect our estimation results, in particular if 
attrition is not random. As has been shown in Table 1 above, about one sixth of the 
observations in our sample do not transit to vocational training or to university within the 
observation period. This is not a problem for our estimation as long as this is “true right-
censoring” in the sense that these individuals are in the sample for the whole observation 
period without transition. However, we loose some of them before the end of the observation 
period. For these individuals, we do not know whether they have a transition in the years that 
would still cover our observation period, but are not observed due to sample attrition. Table 
A4 in the Appendix shows the observation periods of individuals without transition into 
university or vocational training. Without sample attrition, individuals who graduated from 
high-school in 199-2001 should be observed 5 periods, those who graduated in 2002 should 
be observed 4 periods, etc. However, as Table A4 in the Appendix shows, only 30 of the 104 
individuals without transition are observed over the whole observation period, the rest drops 
out before time. Most of these observations are lost in the first or second period after their 
high-school graduation. In order to check whether sample attrition is correlated with any of 
our explanatory variables, we have estimated a model with sample attrition as an additional 
competing risk.  
Estimation results are reported in Table A5 in the Appendix. None of the coefficients of 
the socio-economic variables has a significant influence on leaving the sample. In particular, 
leaving the sample is obviously not correlated with parental income of the BAfoeG claim. 
The only variables that are significant are time and year dummies. Moreover, the coefficients 
of this model for the transition to vocational training or university are not much different from 
our basic model. We thus conclude that sample attrition, although a problem that decreases 
the number of observations of our sample, seems not to bias our estimates of the effect of 
BAfoeG on the transition to university. 
Finally, we check whether our estimation results are sensitive to the relative restrictive 
assumption on the error term structure underlying the multinomial logit specification. In fact, 
                                                 
5  Often, but not necessarily, this occurs on leaving the parental household.    16
a generalized Hausman test rejects the hypothesis that the alternatives vocational training and 
university education are independent. Thus, we have estimated a mixed logit model (random 
coefficient logit model), which does not rely on the IIA assumption, where the constant term 
in each of the two alternative categories university and vocational training is specified as a 
normally distributed random variable. Estimation results for this model yielded a very small 
error variance, no significant change of the log-likelihood and almost the same coefficient 
estimates as for the model without the heterogeneity components (see Table A 6).  
6  Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to contribute to the growing literature on the causal effects of 
financial student aid on enrollment rates into tertiary education. We have estimated the 
average effect of means tested financial student aid provided by the federal government 
(BAfoeG) on the enrollment rate into higher education in Germany. To circumvent the 
problem that BAfoeG is only observable for students and may be endogenous with respect to 
enrolment into university education for other reasons as well, we have calculated for each 
individual the potential BAfoeG amount using a tax-benefit microsimulation model based on 
the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). The simulated potential individual 
BAfoeG amount is a highly nonlinear function of parental income due to the means test, 
important differences in the definition of income relevant for the calculation of BAfoeG, its 
non-indexation to inflation, and its dependence on family background variables other than 
income. This allowed us to identify the effect of BAfoeG on enrollment decisions separately 
from the effect of parents’ income without relying on specific functional form assumptions.  
Our estimation results show that increasing BAfoeG would have a small but significant 
positive effect on the average enrollment rate into university comparable in size to estimates 
for the US. The estimated enrollment effect with respect to parental income is also positive 
and statistically significant. A further interesting result is that a higher BAfoeG amount would 
induce potential students to enrol earlier at university. These effects are based on a discrete-
time hazard rate model which account for both the timing of transitions into higher education 
and right-censored observations. Estimation results seem robust to alternative specifications 
of our microeconometric model, as shown by various model specification checks.  
From a policy perspective, our estimate of a relatively small enrollment elasticity with 
respect to the amount of financial student aid implies that financial incentives alone will not 
achieve the policy goal of substantially increasing the share of students in university 
education within age cohorts at feasible fiscal costs. However, it is important to keep in mind   17
that the enrollment elasticity estimated here and in most other studies is conditional on having 
obtained a high school diploma, which currently is a prerequisite for entering university 
education in Germany. Implementing policies aimed at increasing the share of potential 
students within age cohorts could thus be more effective in achieving the mentioned policy 
goal than increasing the amount of financial student aid.   18
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Appendix 
Table A1: Coefficients and Marginal Effects of the Multinonmial logit model  
  Transition to vocational training Transition  to  university 
Variables  Coefficient Std.  Error  Coefficient Std.  Error 
d2  1.3025  0.3808 1.4886 0.3350 
d3  -1.3624  0.7930 0.2697 0.4137 
d2×male  0.9150  0.5398 0.8481 0.4168 
d3×male  2.3237  1.0062 1.8479 0.5202 
d1999  -0.4135  0.4197 0.0881 0.3040 
d2000 -0.5114  0.3497  -0.6187  0.2892 
d2001 -0.5679  0.3528  -0.4901  0.2565 
d2002 -0.7047  0.3341  -0.4160  0.2431 
d2003  -0.4618  0.3383 0.0053 0.2444 
male -2.1859  0.3349  -1.6016  0.2182 
Monthly BAfoeG amount  0.0529  0.2577  0.2631  0.1927 
Monthly BAfoeG amount squared  0.0205  0.0576  -0.0262  0.0437 
Parents’  net  income  0.0328  0.0211 0.0268 0.0144 
Parents’ net income squared  -0.0002  0.0002  -0.0001  0.0001 
Father holds university degree  -0.8278  0.2643  -0.2100  0.1858 
Mother holds university degree  -0.2853  0.2789  0.3411  0.1915 
One sibling  -0.4596  0.2323  -0.0197  0.1745 
More than one sibling  -0.5034  0.4132  -0.2762  0.2804 
City states  0.0354  0.4263  -0.0188  0.3440 
North-West -0.7086  0.3852  -0.6181  0.2913 
Mid-West  -0.0083  0.2900 0.2473 0.2233 
South  -0.8423  0.3658 0.3382 0.2407 
Constant   -0.3861  0.6571  -0.9730  0.4914 
  Marg. Effect  Std. Error  Marg. Effect  Std. Error 
d2  0.0561  0.0352 0.2784 0.0634 
d3  -0.1030  0.0328 0.1045 0.0998 
d2×male  0.0547  0.0606 0.1503 0.0900 
d3×male  0.1660  0.1875 0.2201 0.1716 
d1999  -0.0413  0.0313 0.0435 0.0707 
d2000 -0.0244  0.0292  -0.1189  0.0578 
d2001 -0.0340  0.0286  -0.0872  0.0540 
d2002 -0.0484  0.0252  -0.0647  0.0524 
d2003  -0.0430  0.0258 0.0243 0.0549 
male -0.1518  0.0345  -0.2568  0.0475 
Monthly BAfoeG amount *  0.0041  0.0121  0.0327  0.0169 
Parents’ net income *  0.0023  0.0022  0.0060  0.0030 
Father holds university degree  -0.0768  0.0244  -0.0143  0.0413 
Mother holds university degree  -0.0444  0.0240  0.0938  0.0436 
One  sibling  -0.0449  0.0222 0.0315 0.0386 
More than one sibling  -0.0313  0.0330  -0.0217  0.0616 
City states  0.0017  0.0410  -0.0192  0.0764 
North-West -0.0433  0.0287  -0.1190  0.0589 
Mid-West  -0.0143  0.0270 0.0532 0.0504 
South  -0.0880  0.0240 0.1136 0.0560 
Number of observations:  929      
Log-likelihood: -791.3      
* The marginal effects for the monthly BAfoeG amount and parents’ income are the combined effects of the 
linear and the quadratic term of BAfoeG and parents’ income, respectively. 
Source: Estimations based on SOEP, waves 2000-2006.   20
Table A2: Coefficients and Marginal Effects of the Multinonmial logit model, linear baseline 
hazard  
  Transition to vocational training Transition  to  university 
Variables  Coefficient Std.  Error Coefficient Std.  Error 
time  0.0053 0.2190  0.4091 0.1634 
time×male  0.7517 0.2974  0.6577 0.2148 
d1999  -0.6571 0.4091  -0.1192 0.2957 
d2000  -0.2441 0.3388  -0.3527 0.2742 
d2001  -0.5832 0.3428  -0.4403 0.2486 
d2002  -0.6901 0.3257  -0.3399 0.2360 
d2003 -0.3826  0.3275  0.0702  0.2373 
male  -2.6272 0.5049  -1.9718 0.3597 
Monthly BafoeG amount  0.0996  0.2576  0.2737  0.1940 
Monthly BAfoeG amount squared  0.0139  0.0565  -0.0261  0.0437 
Parents’  net  income  0.0830 0.0424  0.0604 0.0268 
Parents’ net income squared  -0.0010  0.0007  -0.0004  0.0004 
Father holds university degree  -0.8019  0.2581  -0.1858  0.1796 
Mother holds university degree  -0.2641  0.2723  0.3531  0.1836 
One sibling  -0.3555  0.2247  0.0903  0.1683 
More than one sibling  -0.3922  0.4003  -0.1674  0.2697 
City  states  0.1120 0.4089  0.0134 0.3347 
North-West  -0.6412 0.3752  -0.6116 0.2894 
Mid-West -0.0037  0.2821  0.2212  0.2171 
South -0.7578  0.3587  0.3982  0.2330 
Constant    -0.6806 0.7566  -1.5500 0.5483 
  Marg.  Effect Std.  Error Marg.  Effect Std.  Error. 
Time   -0.0197  0.0211  0.0978  0.0352 
Time×male  0.0493 0.0288  0.1204 0.0463 
d1999  -0.0550 0.0288  -0.0020 0.0675 
d2000  -0.0101 0.0325  -0.0713 0.0582 
d2001  -0.0391 0.0284  -0.0784 0.0530 
d2002  -0.0520 0.0254  -0.0517 0.0516 
d2003 -0.0409  0.0267  0.0343  0.0538 
male  -0.1833 0.0541  -0.3017 0.0713 
Monthly BAfoeG amount *  0.0050  0.0122  0.0332  0.0171 
Parents’ net income *  0.0027  0.0068  0.0068  0.0030 
Father holds university degree  -0.0762  0.0248  -0.0058  0.0403 
Mother holds university degree  -0.0441  0.0246  0.0983  0.0422 
One sibling  -0.0432  0.0226  0.0392  0.0376 
More than one sibling  -0.0316  0.0340  -0.0227  0.0602 
City states  0.0119  0.0439  -0.0026  0.0744 
North-West  -0.0385 0.0305  -0.1141 0.0589 
Mid-West -0.0114  0.0276  0.0536  0.0491 
South -0.0856  0.0249  0.1300  0.0543 
Number of observations:  929       
Log-likelihood: -826.9       
* The marginal effects for the monthly BAfoeG amount and parents’ income are the combined effects of the 
linear and the quadratic term of BAfoeG and parents’ income, respectively. 
Source: Estimations based on SOEP, waves 2000-2006. 
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Table A3: Coefficients and Marginal Effects of the Multinonmial logit model, linear 
specification of BAfoeG 
  Transition to vocational training Transition  to  university 
Variables  Coefficient Std.  Error Coefficient  Std.  Error 
d2  1.3043 0.3803  1.4710 0.3345 
d3 -1.3545  0.7885  0.2049  0.4127 
d2×male  0.9009 0.5400  0.8530 0.4170 
d3×male  2.2729 1.0021  1.8803 0.5192 
d1999 -0.4008  0.4196  0.1180  0.3044 
d2000  -0.4930 0.3504  -0.6123 0.2896 
d2001  -0.5560 0.3532  -0.4683 0.2571 
d2002  -0.6930 0.3337  -0.3827 0.2430 
d2003 -0.4478  0.3377  0.0285  0.2445 
male  -2.1840 0.3350  -1.6118 0.2187 
Monthly BAfoeG amount  0.1596  0.0914  0.1594  0.0685 
Parents’  net  income  0.0767 0.0427  0.0499 0.0271 
Parents’ net income squared  -0.0009  0.0007  -0.0003  0.0004 
Father holds university degree  -0.8414  0.2623  -0.2430  0.1848 
Mother holds university degree  -0.3019  0.2786  0.3344  0.1915 
One sibling  -0.4066  0.2304  0.0539  0.1742 
More than one sibling  -0.4058  0.4076  -0.1430  0.2760 
City  states  -0.0065 0.4199  -0.1273 0.3474 
North-West  -0.7160 0.3827  -0.6648 0.2903 
Mid-West -0.0244  0.2879  0.1934  0.2231 
South -0.8541  0.3650  0.3018  0.2402 
Constant    -0.6815 0.6802  -0.9664 0.4875 
  Marg.  Effect Std.  Error Marg.  Effect  Std.  Error 
d2  0.0577 0.0353  0.2748 0.0633 
d3 -0.1011  0.0333  0.0945  0.0993 
d2×male  0.0532 0.0602  0.1533 0.0900 
d3×male  0.1538 0.1817  0.2350 0.1679 
d1999 -0.0418  0.0312  0.0457  0.0708 
d2000  -0.0244 0.0292  -0.1198 0.0577 
d2001  -0.0346 0.0285  -0.0865 0.0541 
d2002  -0.0492 0.0251  -0.0625 0.0524 
d2003 -0.0434  0.0257  0.0261  0.0549 
male  -0.1514 0.0345  -0.2579 0.0475 
Monthly BAfoeG amount *  0.0092  0.0088  0.0306  0.0169 
Parents’ net income *  0.0025  0.0022  0.0055  0.0029 
Father holds university degree  -0.0751  0.0241  -0.0191  0.0409 
Mother holds university degree  -0.0453  0.0239  0.0950  0.0436 
One sibling  -0.0454  0.0222  0.0323  0.0386 
More than one sibling  -0.0327  0.0326  -0.0171  0.0615 
City states  0.0053  0.0413  -0.0299  0.0749 
North-West  -0.0418 0.0288  -0.1243 0.0582 
Mid-West -0.0118  0.0268  0.0478  0.0500 
South -0.0865  0.0240  0.1084  0.0557 
Number of observations:  929      
Log-likelihood: -791.8        
* The marginal effects for the monthly BAfoeG amount and parents’ income are the combined effects of the 
linear and the quadratic term of BAfoeG and parents’ income, respectively. 
Source: Estimations based on SOEP, waves 2000-2006. 
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Table A4:  Observation periods of individuals without transition into university or vocational 
training 
Number of periods observed  Year of  
high-school  graduation  1 2 3 4 5  Total 
Y e a r         
1999  2 1 1 0 0 4 
2000  6 2 2 1 0  11 
2001  7 4 1 1 0  13 
2002  6 2 0 0 0 8 
2003  10 8 2 0 0  20 
2004  20 6 0 0 0  26 
2005  22 0 0 0 0  22 
Total  73 23  6 22  0  104 
Source: SOEP, waves 2000-2006 
  
Table A5:  Multinomial logit model, specification with sample attrition as separate state 
Variables  Coeff. Std.  Error Coeff. Std.  Error  Coeff.  Std.  Error 
Transition to …  Vocational Training  University  Sample Attrition 
d2  1.5490 0.4184 1.7350 0.3770  1.4689 0.7019 
d3  -1.3848 0.7975 0.2341 0.4238  -0.1956 1.1247 
d2×male  0.6299 0.5689 0.5624 0.4541  -1.8672 0.9183 
d3×male  2.2310 1.0107 1.7683 0.5306  -0.8910 1.5488 
d1999  -0.5656 0.4224  -0.0680 0.3087  -2.5290 1.0626 
d2000  -0.6158 0.3558  -0.7354 0.2971  -1.0270 0.5992 
d2001  -0.6917 0.3575  -0.6148 0.2632  -1.4411 0.5921 
d2002  -0.7756 0.3395  -0.4822 0.2508  -0.6403 0.4757 
d2003  -0.5837 0.3430  -0.1188 0.2515  -1.2782 0.5919 
male  -2.1581 0.3369  -1.5782 0.2217  0.3686 0.4434 
Monthly  BAfoeG  amount  0.1391 0.2672 0.3313 0.2012  0.2577 0.4535 
Monthly  BAfoeG  amount  squared  0.0078 0.0589  -0.0370 0.0451  -0.0154 0.1005 
Parents’  net  income  0.0813 0.0432 0.0594 0.0280  0.0871 0.0734 
Parents’  net  income  squared  -0.0009 0.0007  -0.0004 0.0004  -0.0010 0.0011 
Father holds univ. degree  -0.7912  0.2677  -0.1680  0.1899  0.6279  0.4128 
Mother  holds  univ.  degree  -0.2963 0.2819 0.3307 0.1960  0.0400 0.4043 
One  sibling  -0.3582 0.2329 0.0965 0.1775  0.5963 0.4030 
More  than  one  sibling  -0.3652 0.4127  -0.1294 0.2828  0.5452 0.6138 
City  states  -0.0404 0.4292  -0.1065 0.3560  -0.3234 0.8701 
North-West  -0.6467 0.3896  -0.5573 0.2978  0.8209 0.5783 
Mid-West  0.0267 0.2943 0.2816 0.2288  0.6276 0.5104 
South  -0.8760 0.3693 0.3129 0.2450  -0.2384 0.6508 
Constant    -0.6466 0.7144  -1.0995 0.5190  -4.3080 1.2922 
Number of observations  929        
Log likelihood  -901.9        
Source: Estimation based on  SOEP. waves 2000-2006. 
   23
Table A6:  Random-effects multinomial logit specification 
Variables Transition  to  vocational  training Transition  to  university 
  Coeff.  Std. Error  Coeff.  Std. Error 
D2 1.3025  0.3808  1.4886  0.3350 
D3 -1.3624  0.7930  0.2697  0.4137 
D2×male  0.9150 0.5398 0.8481  0.4168 
D3×male  2.3237 1.0062 1.8479  0.5202 
d1999 -0.4135  0.4197  0.0881  0.3040 
d2000 -0.5114  0.3497  -0.6187  0.2892 
d2001 -0.5679  0.3528  -0.4901  0.2565 
d2002 -0.7047  0.3341  -0.4160  0.2431 
d2003 -0.4618  0.3383  0.0053  0.2444 
male -2.1859  0.3349  -1.6016  0.2182 
BAfoeG level 1  0.0529  0.2577  0.2631  0.1927 
BAfoeG level 2  0.0205  0.0576  -0.0262  0.0437 
BAfoeG level 3  0.0328  0.0211  0.0268  0.0144 
Parents’ net income  -0.0002  0.0002  -0.0001  0.0001 
Parents’ net income squared  -0.8278  0.2643  -0.2100  0.1858 
Parents live together  -0.2853  0.2789  0.3411  0.1915 
Father holds university degree  -0.4596  0.2323  -0.0197  0.1745 
Mother holds university degree  -0.5034  0.4132  -0.2762  0.2804 
One sibling  0.0354  0.4263  -0.0188  0.3440 
More than one sibling  -0.7086  0.3852  -0.6181  0.2913 
City states  -0.0083  0.2900  0.2473  0.2233 
North-West -0.8423  0.3658  0.3382  0.2407 
Mid-West -0.3861  0.6571  -0.9730  0.4914 
South 1.3025  0.3808  1.4886  0.3350 
Constant   -1.3624  0.7930  0.2697  0.4137 
Variance of Random Effect  1.615 e-16  6.879 e-09     
Number of obs:  929       
Log likelihood:  -791.3       
Source: Estimation based on  SOEP. waves 2000-2006. 
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Figure A1:   Scatter plot of the potential amount of BAfoeG and parents’ net income (equivalence 
income) in Euro per month 
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Figure A2: Mean of potential BAfoeG amount and parents’ net income (equivalence income) by 
year, 1999-2005 (all amounts in Euro per month) 
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 Note:  Weighted using SOEP cross-sectional weighing factors.    25
Figure A3:   Cumulated probability of transition to university for men and women, based on a 
 model with linear baseline hazard 
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